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1. Introduction 
Deflationism about truth (henceforth, deflationism) comes in a variety 
of versions 1  Variety notwithstanding, there is widespread consensus 
among advocates of different stripes of deflationism (disquotationalism, 
minimalism, prosententialism, etc.) with respect to the following no-
explanatory-role claim concerning the concept of truth: 
 
(NER) The concept of truth has no explanatory role to play in 
philosophical explanations (nor, for that matter, in non-philosophical 
explanations). 
 
Versions of (NER) can be found in Armour-Garb (2012), Brandom 
(2002), Dodd (2013), Field (2001), Grover (2002), Horwich (1998, 2010), 
Soames (1999) and Williams (2002, 2007), to give just a few examples. In 
one way or another, all of these authors seem to hold that (NER) follows 
from their respective deflationary accounts of truth. To be sure, they do not 
intend to deny that truth talk is sometimes useful (or even indispensable) 
for the purposes of formulating and expressing explanations of, say, our 
epistemic practices, meaning and propositional content, practical success 
or the success of scientific theories. But, they insist, truth talk does not and 
cannot contribute any genuinely explanatory content to the explanations 
which we formulate with its help. Its contribution to them is, as Michael 
Williams puts it, “wholly expressive, thus never explanatory” (Williams 
1999, p. 547). 
In what follows I argue that (NER) is false. My argument begins with 
the question of why the following conditional holds: 
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An assertion of <some dogs are vicious> is correct only if some dogs are 
vicious.2 
 
My contention is that the best available answer to this question—the 
best available explanation of why the conditional holds—is in terms of an 
explanatory “because”-statement whose explanans-clause contains truth 
talk that is both inaccessible to standard deflationary treatment and 
explanatory.3 I take this to amount to a counterexample against (NER). Of 
course, nothing in what follows hinges on the peculiarities of assertions of 
<DOGS>. 
Michael Williams (2002, p. 157) suggests that an example of a genuinely 
explanatory use of the concept of truth, i.e. a counterexample to (NER), 
would amount to a refutation of deflationism—not just of this or that 
specific deflationary account of truth but of the deflationary outlook on 
truth quite generally. I will be cautious with regard to the question of 
whether Williams is right. Maybe a counterexample to (NER) should not 
per se be taken to amount to a refutation of deflationism because, maybe, 
there is no good reason for deflationists qua deflationists to commit 
themselves to (NER) in the first place—contrary to what many of them 
seem to think. In fact, the claim that deflationism entails or in some other, 
logically weaker, way requires acceptance of (NER) has recently come 
under criticism. Nic Damnjanovic (2005, 2010), for instance, points to a 
way in which, arguably, one can be a deflationist about truth without 
committing oneself to (NER), and Leon Horsten, in outlining his 
inferentialist version of deflationism, suggests that “perhaps we should 
divorce deflationism from the claim that the concept of truth has no 
explanatory function in specific philosophical disciplines” (Horsten 2011, 
p. 92; see also 2009, 2010). 
The next two sections prepare the ground by rehearsing the standard 
deflationary account of the role and function of truth talk. In the fourth 
section I present a counterexample to (NER). The fifth section discusses 
various objections that my line argument is likely to provoke. The final 
one contains a very brief discussion concerning the question of whether 
my counterexample to (NER) should be taken to show the deflationary 
outlook on truth to be mistaken. 
In what follows the focus is on deflationary accounts of truth for 
propositions. However, what I have to say carries over, mutatis mutandis, 
to deflationary accounts of truth for (utterances of) sentences. 
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2. Deflationism and the no-explanatory-role claim 
Consider the distinction between revealing and unrevealing contexts or 
environments of truth talk (see Soames 1999, p. 230). A context, C, of 
truth talk, is revealing if and only if the proposition(s) which truth is 
predicated of in C is (are) immediately recoverable from C alone. By way 
of example: 
 
<Some dogs are vicious> is true. 
 
If NASA’s press releases are to be believed, then <Curiosity has found 
traces of water on Mars> is true. 
 
Notice that, in the sense intended here, predicating truth of a 
proposition does not always amount to asserting or endorsing that 
proposition. In the antecedent of “if <DOGS> is true, then some dogs are 
dangerous” truth is predicated of <DOGS>, but <DOGS> is not asserted or 
endorsed. The same holds for the consequent in the second example of 
revealing truth talk given above. 
A context C, of truth talk, is unrevealing if and only if C is such that 
the propositions which are at issue are not immediately recoverable from 
it—either because we have no information as to what they are or because 
there are too many of them: 
 
Some of what Khrushchev asserted in 1960 is true. 
 
Every proposition of the form “p → p” is true. 
 
Deflationists sometimes say that unrevealing environments of truth talk 
give us a hint as to the raison d’être of truth locutions in our languages 
(see, for instance, Horwich 2010, pp. 4-5). If it were not for the utility of 
the truth predicate in formulating general statements of the kind just 
displayed, use of that predicate would be dispensable quite generally (see 
Soames 1999, p. 230; Horwich 1998, p. 39). Assuming, plausibly, that all 
contexts of truth talk are either revealing or unrevealing, the deflationist 
can be interpreted as offering the conjunction of the following two claims 
as an account of the role of the truth predicate in our discourses: 
 
(a) When the truth predicate is used in a revealing environment, use of that 
predicate is usually dispensable in the following sense: what is said by 
predicating truth of some given proposition can be said without loss of, or 
other changes in, relevant content by directly expressing that proposition. 
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(b) Whenever the truth predicate is used in unrevealing contexts, its 
contribution to the expression of what is said in those contexts can be 
exhaustively accounted for in terms of its role as a device for facilitating 
the formulation of a specific kind of generalisation over propositions. 
 
There are two qualifiers in (a), “usually” and “relevant”. The qualifier 
“relevant” is needed to make room for denying the simple redundancy 
claim according to which the meaning of a revealing truth ascription 
(“<DOGS> is true”, say) just is the proposition that truth is ascribed to 
(<DOGS>)—a claim that most contemporary deflationists want to deny 
(see, for instance, Horwich 1998, p. 124; Damnjanovic 2010, p. 45). The 
qualifier “usually”, on the other hand, is required once the restriction to 
relevant content is in place. In fact, once it is admitted that the content of a 
revealing truth ascription is not exhausted by the proposition that truth is 
ascribed to, it cannot be ruled out that competent speakers sometimes utter 
revealing truth ascriptions precisely because the content they want to 
express could not be expressed without employing propositionally 
revealing truth talk. In other words, it cannot be excluded that sometimes 
the extra content of revealing truth ascriptions is (part of) the relevant 
content.4 
Deflationists maintain that in order to see why truth talk is (usually) 
dispensable in revealing contexts and how the truth predicate performs its 
generalising role in unrevealing environments it is sufficient to appeal to 
the (non-paradoxical) instances of the equivalence schema 
 
(ES) <p> is true ↔ p. 
 
I will come back to this point in the next section. 
How do these deflationary theses concerning the role of truth talk 
relate to the no-explanatory-role claim (NER), which concerns the concept 
of truth? (NER) states that the notion of truth is explanatorily inert. 
Deflationists who subscribe to (NER) provide this sweeping claim with a 
tangible interpretation. One aspect of this interpretation—the one that will 
be particularly relevant to the following discussion—is this claim: any 
explanatory work that can be done by some revealing truth ascription, R, 
can equally well be done by the proposition(s) that truth is ascribed to in R 
(see Horwich 1998, p. 49). 
As mentioned above, deflationists do not maintain that utilising the 
word “true” in philosophical explanations is a somehow defective practice. 
In subscribing to (NER) they do not intend to prohibit the use of truth talk 
in such explanations. 5  Rather, they distinguish between truth-talk’s 
involvement or occurrence in formulations of explanations on the one 
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hand, and truth-talk’s contributing explanatory content to what is expressed 
by those formulations on the other—in order to then insist that whenever 
“is true” occurs in the formulation of explanations its use is either 
dispensable in the sense of (a) or can be entirely accounted for in terms of 
its role as a device for expressing a certain kind of generalisation in the 
sense of (b). The deflationary account of the role of truth talk relates to 
(NER) via a line of reasoning that deflationists who advocate (NER) often 
leave implicit but clearly rely upon. In large outlines, the reasoning goes as 
follows: 
 
(DeflatioNER)  
1. For any explanation, E, involving truth talk, if the truth talk in E can be 
adequately accounted for along the lines of either (a) or (b), then it does 
not contribute explanatory content to E. 
2. For any explanation, E, involving truth talk, the truth talk in E can be 
adequately accounted for along the lines of either (a) or (b). 
3. Therefore, for any explanation, E, involving truth talk, the truth talk in E 
does not contribute explanatory content to E. 
 
I accept the first premise of (DeflatioNER) for the sake of argument, 
and I take issue with the second. More precisely, I take the argument 
overall to suggest a promising strategy for identifying candidate 
counterexamples to (NER). The strategy suggested by (DeflatioNER) is to 
try to find counterexamples to its second premise. One way to pursue this 
strategy is to try to identify an occurrence of the predicate “is true” in the 
explanans-clause of a true explanatory “because”-statement, where the 
occurrence of “is true” is such that its function (or role) cannot be 
accounted for by either (a) or (b). Of course, not all explanations can be 
couched in terms of “because”-statements since, for instance, some 
explanations answer to “what is”-questions rather than to “why”-questions 
(cf. Jenkins 2008). In order for the following to go through, however, it is 
sufficient to make the uncontroversial assumption that one paradigmatic 
way of asking for an explanation is by means of “why”-questions and that 
one paradigmatic way of giving explanations is by means of “because”-
statements. 
Before stating what I take to be a counterexample to the second 
premise of (DeflatioNER)—and arguing that it is also a counterexample to 
(NER)—it will be useful to rehearse the deflationary treatment of a norm 
of assertion whose normative content prima facie involves the notion of 
truth. 
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3. A norm of assertion and its deflationary treatment 
Assertions are open to normative assessment along many different 
lines. They can be objectionable or praiseworthy for moral reasons, they 
can be epistemically justified or unjustified, boring or interesting, relevant 
or irrelevant to their conversational context etc. Speech acts of assertion 
can exemplify all of these qualities and defects (and many more) quite 
independently of whether their propositional contents are true or not. 
However, consider the following semantic constraint on the correctness of 
assertoric speech acts: 
 
(SCA) It is correct to assert a proposition only if it is true. 
 
It would seem that the truth predicate makes an important contribution 
to the normative content of this constraint. Not so, says the deflationist. 
Granting the use which is here being made of “is true” as entirely proper 
and unobjectionable, she insists that, in (SCA), “is true” is only being used 
to achieve the right kind of generality: it makes an important contribution 
to the formulation or expression of the general constraint, but it does not 
contribute anything to (SCA)’s normative content proper. 
In fact, what deflationists have to say about the role of the truth 
predicate in formulations of norms for assertion echoes what they have to 
say about the role of that predicate in explanations. They do not intend to 
prohibit the use of “is true” for the purpose of formulating norms of 
assertion. Rather, they appeal to the distinction between the mere 
occurrence of truth talk within formulations of such norms and truth-talk’s 
contributing genuinely normative content to what is expressed by those 
formulations—in order to then insist that whenever “true” is being used in 
the formulation of norms of assertion its use is either dispensable in the 
sense of (a) or can be entirely accounted for in terms of its role as a device 
for the expression of generalisations in the sense of (b). The deflationist’s 
argument for the claim that truth talk does not contribute genuinely 
normative content to norms of assertion like (SCA) is simply 
(DeflatioNER) with “norm” in place of “explanation” and “normative” in 
place of “explanatory”.6 
In order to establish the more specific claim that the truth predicate 
makes no contribution to the normative content expressed by (SCA) 
deflationists offer the following line of argument. With the variable x 
taking propositions as values and singular terms denoting propositions as 
substituents, (SCA) can be stated more formally in this way: 
 
(SCA) ∀x (It is correct to assert x → x is true). 
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If we express the semantic constraint by means of a first-order 
universal quantification, the last occurrence of the bound referential 
variable x requires a predicate—and the predicate best suited for the job is, 
of course, “is true”. However, it would be hasty to take the fact that truth 
talk facilitates the expression of the normative content of (SCA) as 
evidence for the thesis that the concept of truth is involved in the 
normative content expressed by (SCA). This becomes clear, says the 
deflationist, when we consider an arbitrarily chosen instance of (SCA), 
say: 
 
(T+) It is correct to assert <some dogs are vicious> → <some dogs are 
vicious> is true. 
 
There is an obvious way of expressing the normative content of (T+) 
without using the truth predicate. Since (T+) is a context of truth talk that 
is both propositionally revealing and transparent, we can immediately 
apply the left-to-right direction of the relevant instance of (ES), i.e. of 
 
<Some dogs are vicious> is true ↔ some dogs are vicious, 
 
to the consequent of (T+) and write (T-) instead of (T+): 
 
(T-) It is correct to assert <some dogs are vicious> → some dogs are 
vicious. 
 
At this point a deflationist will point out that the normative contents of 
(T-) and (T+) are identical even though, contrary to (T+), (T-) does not 
involve truth talk at all. The claim that (T+) and (T-) have identical 
normative contents can be spelled out along the following lines: every 
assertion of <DOGS> that satisfies the necessary condition of assertoric 
correctness specified by (T+) also satisfies the necessary condition 
specified by (T-), and vice versa. Assuming (T+) and (T-) to be declarative 
equivalents of the imperatives “[assert <DOGS>] only if <DOGS> is true!” 
and “[assert <DOGS>] only if some dogs are vicious!”, respectively, 
another way to make the same point is this: there is nothing a person could 
rationally do in order to comply with (T+) that she could not also rationally 
do in order to comply with (T-), and vice versa. Notice, in passing, that to 
say that the normative contents expressed by (T+) and (T-) are identical is 
not to say that (T+) and (T-) express identical contents tout court. 
So the normative point of (T+) can be expressed without employing the 
concept of truth and, importantly, in doing so, there is no need to replace 
use of that concept with use of any other.7 All that needs to be appealed to 
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is the relevant instance of (ES). The treatment just applied to (T+) works 
for every instance of (SCA); and this, according to the deflationist, should 
be taken to show that the only reason why the predicate “is true” appears 
in (SCA) is that it—together with the apparatus of referential 
quantification—conveniently enables the formulation of a universal 
generalisation which entails every instance of 
 
(T+schematic) It is correct to assert <p> → <p> is true 
 
and, together with the relevant instances of (ES), every instance of 
 
(T-schematic) It is correct to assert <p> → p. 
 
For what follows it is important to emphasise that I do not take issue 
with the deflationary treatment of (SCA). Again for the sake of argument, I 
accept the claim that for each instance, I+, of (T+schematic), there is at least 
one instance, I-, of (T-schematic), such that the normative contents of I+ and I- 
are identical (and vice versa for each instance, I-, of (T-schematic)). 
Deflationists treat this point as a satisfactory end to the debate on the 
role of the truth predicate in (SCA). As far as the normative content of 
(SCA) is concerned, they may very well be right in doing so. However, 
there is a sequel to that debate. The sequel concerns the question of how 
we are to understand the instances of (T-schematic) and, or so I will argue in 
the remainder, it is bound to involve truth talk in a way that cannot be 
accounted for along the standard deflationary lines, (a) and (b), introduced 
in the last section. 
4. A counterexample to the no-explanatory-role claim 
The instances of (T-schematic) stand in need of explanation. With regard to 
every single one it is legitimate to ask: why does it hold? In what follows I 
use (T-) as an arbitrarily chosen example-instance of (T-schematic). Consider 
the following question, then: 
 
(Q) Why is an assertion of <some dogs are vicious> correct only if some 
dogs are vicious? 
 
Alternatively: 
 
(Q) Why does (T-) hold? 
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Here it might be objected that (T-) does not hold and that, 
consequently, (Q) should be dismissed. I will come back to this worry in 
the next section. For the time being I assume that (Q) cannot be dismissed 
so easily. So, given that (Q) is a good question, a good answer to (Q) 
would provide us with an explanation of why (T-) holds—to put it in fewer 
words, with an explanation of (T-). What, then, should one expect from an 
explanation of (T-)? At the very least it should help us understand why the 
existence (or non-existence) of vicious dogs is relevant to the correctness 
(or incorrectness) of assertions of <DOGS>. It should break an explanatory 
path from the existence or non-existence of vicious dogs to the normative 
status (correctness or incorrectness) of assertoric speech acts which have 
<DOGS> as their propositional content. In asserting <DOGS> we do not 
assert dogs or any of their dispositions. Therefore the detour via the 
proposition that some dogs are vicious, i.e. via the propositional content 
that is shared by all assertions of <DOGS>, seems inevitable in answering 
(Q). It is hard to see how the relevance of whether or not there are vicious 
dogs to the normative status of assertions of <DOGS> could be thought of 
as not mediated by some property (substantial or not) that <DOGS> can 
(fail to) exemplify—by something that appertains to <DOGS> only if some 
dogs are vicious. This suggests that what we have to do in order to explain 
(T-) is identify a predicate G of propositions that satisfies (at least) the 
following two conditions: 
 
(i) G applies to <DOGS> only if some dogs are vicious, and 
(ii) <DOGS>’s being G or not being G partly determines the normative 
status of assertions of <DOGS>, such that an assertion of <DOGS> is correct 
only if <DOGS> is G. 
 
Unsurprisingly, I think that the predicate that best meets conditions (i) 
and (ii) is the predicate “is true”. So my claim is that the following 
“because”-statement is (part of) the best available explanation of (T-), i.e. 
(part of) the best available answer to (Q): 
 
(A+) [It is correct to assert <DOGS> only if some dogs are vicious] because 
[<DOGS> is true only if some dogs are vicious]. 
 
In (A+) “is true” occurs in the explanans-clause of a “because”-
statement whose explanandum-clause is (T-). It is used in a (partial) 
explanation of the relevance of the existence or non-existence of vicious 
dogs for the normative status of assertions of <DOGS>. Given the 
deflationist’s advice not to confuse the mere occurrence of the truth 
predicate in the explanans of some explanation, E, with evidence for the 
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claim that the notion of truth contributes genuinely explanatory content to 
E, it is fair to ask: if its role in (A+) is not explanatory, then what role does 
the truth predicate play in (A+)? Can the deflationist account for the role of 
the truth talk involved in (A+)? More precisely, can she account for it in 
one of the standard deflationary ways, (a) and (b), introduced above? 
It is obvious that in (A+) “is true” is not being used to formulate a 
generalisation of the kind that is dear to deflationists (and non-deflationists 
as well). There is only one proposition at play here and, importantly, we 
know exactly which one it is. The explanans-clause of (A+) is a 
propositionally revealing context of truth talk. So the truth talk involved in 
it cannot be accounted for along the lines of (b). 
But it is not accessible to deflationary treatment in terms of (a) either. 
Since the deflationist claims that any explanatory work that can be done 
by a revealing truth ascription, R, can equally well be done by the 
proposition that truth is ascribed to in R, one might expect her to hold that 
the truth talk in (A+) is dispensable in precisely this sense: the explanatory 
work that can be done with it can equally well be done without it—by 
using a sentence that expresses <DOGS> instead of one that expresses 
<<DOGS> is true> in the antecedent of (A+)’s explanans-clause. However, 
the deflationist would be ill-advised to put forward this claim. Unlike 
“<DOGS> is true only if some dogs are vicious”, the tautology “some dogs 
are vicious only if some dogs are vicious” on its own cannot be used to 
state even a partial explanation of (T-). The proposition it expresses has no 
explanatory value at all with regard to the question of why the normative 
status of assertions of <DOGS> (partly) depends on whether there are 
vicious dogs. The following “because”-sentence expresses a false 
proposition, despite the truth of the propositions expressed by the two 
clauses that it connects by “because”: 
 
(A-) [It is correct to assert <DOGS> only if some dogs are vicious] because 
[some dogs are vicious only if some dogs are vicious]. 
 
This point reinforces the claim that in explaining (T-) we cannot 
contend ourselves with talk about dogs and their properties. The detour via 
some property that <DOGS> can (fail) to exemplify is indispensable in 
answering (Q). Not any old property that <DOGS> can reasonably be 
claimed (not) to exemplify will do. The only one that has explanatory 
import with respect to (T-) is the property of truth. Therefore, given her 
commitment to (NER), the deflationist would seem to be in a rather 
difficult dialectical position when it comes to the question of why the 
existence or non-existence of vicious dogs is relevant to the normative 
status of assertions of <DOGS>. 
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At this stage, if not before, the deflationist might complain that the line 
of argument just presented is wrong-headed. After all, the explanans-
clause in (A+) is just the left-to-right direction of an instance of (ES), and 
all (non-paradoxical) instances of (ES), together with the propositions 
expressed by them, are available to the deflationist by default, as it were. 
The proposition expressed by the explanans-clause of (A+) is, for example, 
entailed by an axiom of Horwich’s Minimalist Theory of truth (see 
Horwich 1998, pp. 17-20). So, the thought would have to go, the 
deflationist can dismiss the demand for an account, in terms of (a) or (b), 
of the truth-predicate’s role in (A+) since there is nothing in her 
deflationism which prevents her from simply accepting (A+) as a (partial) 
explanation of (T-). 
These points are important. But they do not lend support to the 
complaint that the line of argument presented above is on the wrong track. 
Rather, they speak in favour of the claim that deflationists should be more 
cautious in answering the question of whether their respective version of 
deflationism commits them to (NER). Accepting (A+) as a partial 
explanation of (T-) amounts to accepting that the left-to-right direction of 
the relevant instance of (ES) is capable of doing explanatory work. Since 
the left-to-right direction of that instance, when employed in the context of 
explaining (T-), contains truth talk which is not accessible to deflationary 
treatment in terms of (a) or (b), a deflationist who accepts (A+) would 
seem to be forced to grant that the explanans-clause of (A+) is capable of 
doing its work precisely in virtue of the conceptual contribution that the 
truth predicate makes to the explanatory content which is expressed by it. 
If this is correct, then there is a rather blatant tension between (NER) and 
the claim that instances of (ES) can be used explanatorily. If the latter 
claim holds good, then (NER) is false, and if (NER) is true, then instances 
of (ES) cannot be used explanatorily. 
The deflationist will have to make a choice here. She can either 
maintain the thesis that the concept of truth is explanatorily inert, i.e. she 
can stick to (NER), or she can hold that instances of the equivalence 
schema can have explanatory import. But she cannot consistently hold 
both. 
The tension just described is quite evident in Horwich, for example. 
On the one hand, he holds that “all of the facts whose expression involves 
the truth predicate may be explained […] by assuming no more about truth 
than instances of the equivalence schema” (Horwich 1998, p. 23). On the 
other hand he claims that “whenever we deploy the concept of truth non-
trivially – whether in logic, ordinary language, science or philosophy – it 
is playing this role: a device of generalization” (Horwich 2002, p. 138). Of 
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course, the description of the (normative) fact registered by (T-) does not 
(have to) involve the truth predicate. But still, that fact is one whose 
explanation should at least not be rendered impossible by one’s account of 
truth—and deflationism would seem to have precisely this undesirable 
effect. 
I do not want to put too much weight on these points, however. For the 
sake of argument, let us assume that they do not establish that accepting 
(A+) precludes one from accepting (NER), and vice versa. 
I have already alluded to the fact that the explanation of (T-) in terms 
of (A+) is incomplete or partial. By itself this observation does not 
disqualify (A+) as an answer to (Q). A “because”-statement can be true—
and thus have explanatory value—even if what it expresses is only a 
partial or incomplete explanation of what is described by its explanandum-
clause (Schnieder 2006, p. 32). No doubt, there are many different 
possible approaches to rendering (A+) more complete as an explanation of 
(T-). However, there is one explanatory lacuna in (A+) which any such 
approach will have to fill in order to be acceptable. What is clearly 
missing in (A+) is an explicit statement of the explanatory link between the 
truth or untruth of <DOGS> and the correctness or incorrectness of 
assertions of <DOGS>. As far as the possible approaches to filling this 
explanatory gap in (A+) are concerned there is not much of a choice. 
Eventually appeal will have to be made to (T+). In fact, the most 
immediate way to render (A+) more complete consists in adding (T+) to its 
explanans-clause. This gives us: 
 
(B) [It is correct to assert <DOGS> only if some dogs are vicious] because 
[<DOGS> is true only if some dogs are vicious, and it is correct to assert 
<DOGS> only if <DOGS> is true]. 
 
While the first conjunct of the explanans-clause in (B) might—for the 
reasons discussed above—be available to the deflationist, its second 
conjunct, i.e. (T+), is not available to her in the context of explaining (T-). 
She has already used (T-) in her account of (T+) (see section 2, above), and 
having done so precludes her from now using (T+) in explaining (T-). 
Moreover, and more importantly, the role of the truth predicate in the 
second conjunct cannot be accounted for along the lines of either (a) or 
(b). While the deflationist might be able to accommodate this point with 
respect to the first conjunct, it is hard to see how she could do so with 
regard to the second. The truth talk involved in the second conjunct of 
(B)’s explanans-clause does not serve the expression of a generalisation. 
That excludes (b). But neither is it dispensable in the sense that the 
explanatory work that is done by (T+) in the explanans of (B) can equally 
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well be done by (T-). (T-) is our explanandum, and it cannot be used to 
explain itself. That excludes (a). 
Due to her commitment to (NER), which is based on the argument 
(DeflatioNER), it would seem that the deflationist is left with no choice 
but to reject (B) as an explanation of (T-). And given that (Q) is a 
legitimate request for explanation, the rejection of (B) commits her to 
offering an explanation of (T-) which, while being at least as good as (B), 
either does not involve truth talk at all or uses it exclusively as a device for 
expressing generalisations. But such an explanation does not seem to be 
forthcoming. I will come back to this shortly. 
(B) is a counterexample to the second premise of the argument 
(DeflatioNER)—a counterexample, that is, to the claim that for any 
explanation, E, involving truth talk, the truth talk in E can be adequately 
accounted for along the lines of either (a) or (b). In order to see that (B) is 
also a counterexample to (NER) it is sufficient to appreciate that, in (B), it 
is the truth predicate which forges the explanatory link between the 
existence or non-existence of vicious dogs and the normative status of 
assertions of <some dogs are vicious>. Contrary to what many 
deflationists maintain, there is a genuinely explanatory role for the concept 
of truth in philosophical theorizing. It can be found in what is expressed 
by the explanans-clause of (B)—and, arguably, already in what is 
expressed by the explanans-clause of (A+). Moreover, since the assertion 
of <DOGS> is an arbitrarily chosen example there would seem to be a 
plethora of genuinely explanatory roles for the concept of truth. 
5. Discussion of objections 
It might be objected (1) that (T-) does not hold (and therefore doesn’t 
need explaining), (2) that (T-) can, after all, be explained without making 
use of the concept of truth, (3) that (T-) registers a basic or brute constraint 
on the correctness of assertoric speech acts which have <DOGS> as their 
content, (4) that the failure of the standard deflationary ways in accounting 
for the role of truth talk in the explanans-clause of (B) is simply due to the 
fact that “because” creates non-extensional contexts, (5) that the 
explanations (A+) and (B) of (T-) do not pose a problem for the deflationist 
advocate of (NER) because (NER), as she intends it, concerns the role of 
the concept of truth in causal explanations only. I discuss these rejoinders 
in turn. 
(1) In asking “why”-questions speakers presuppose that what they 
respectively request an explanation for is indeed the case. If (T-) does not 
hold, then (Q)—“why does (T-) hold?”—should be dismissed as ill-posed. 
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Consequently, one strategy to block the line of argument presented above 
would be to reject (T-). Is this a viable strategy to pursue for the 
deflationist? 
I do not think so. If there are no vicious dogs then any speaker who 
asserts <DOGS> commits a mistake. Taking the expression “correct” in (T-) 
to mean “not mistaken” in the sense just hinted at, it seems rather difficult 
to find fault with the claim that (T-) expresses a valid constraint on the 
correctness of assertions of <DOGS>. The denial of (T-) would amount to 
the claim that the existence or non-existence of vicious dogs is irrelevant 
to the normative status of (some) assertions of <DOGS>. That seems 
plainly wrong, however, and it flies in the face of what, arguably by 
default, is the central point of asserting <DOGS>. Moreover, it seems to be 
something that no deflationist would want to be committed to—at least not 
in virtue of her deflationism alone. This objection, then, can be set to one 
side. 
(2) I have argued for the claims that (B) is the best available 
explanation of (T-) and that the deflationist’s rejection of (B) commits her 
to explaining (T-) in a way—at least on a par with (B) as regards 
explanatory force—that either steers completely clear of the concept of 
truth or employs it exclusively in its generalising function. Moreover, I 
have claimed that such an explanation does not seem to be forthcoming. Is 
this last claim warranted? 
As mentioned in section 3, deflationists offer an explanation of the 
general semantic constraint (SCA)—it is correct to assert a proposition 
only if it is true—which they, rather convincingly, take to establish that the 
truth talk involved in (SCA) can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of 
its role as a device for formulating a useful kind of generalisation, i.e. in 
terms of (b). However, as far as explaining (T-), or rather, as far as 
explaining particular instances of the schema “it is correct to assert <p>, 
only if p” is concerned, the deflationary literature has little to offer. To date 
both deflationists and their opponents have tended to ignore that particular 
norms like (T-) will appear to be unproblematic only as long as a prior 
understanding of the speech act of assertion is simply presupposed. Both 
sides, that is, have tended to ignore that, once the concept of assertion is 
put on the agenda, questions like (Q) will become legitimate requests for 
explanation. This tendency can probably be construed as a result of the 
prevalent focus of current debates concerning the explanatory role and the 
normative import of the concept of truth. Understandably, the focus of 
these debates has been squarely on statements of general epistemic norms 
and on general theses that purport to explain, for instance, meaning in 
terms of truth conditions or practical success in terms of desire and true 
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belief. Deflationists have made a remarkably strong case for the claim that 
the truth talk involved in such theses figures “merely [as] a device of 
generalisation” (Horwich 2002, p. 140). However, that claim rests on 
treating the observation that particular instances of the norms and theses in 
question can be reformulated sans truth talk and without loss of (relevant) 
content as the natural end of the debate. What about the “true”-free 
reformulations of the particular instances themselves? Sticking to my 
example, what about (T-)? 
The closest that one gets to reading an attempt at offering a “true”-free 
explanation of particular norms like (T-) in the works of advocates of 
deflationism is Horwich’s account of the “normative significance of truth” 
(Horwich 1998, p. 139) for belief. Horwich generally translates issues 
concerning normativity into issues concerning desirability. In the present 
context, this general approach leads him to turn the question of why truth 
has normative significance for belief into the question of why the 
following principle (see Horwich 2002, p. 135), let’s call it (DT), holds 
good: 
 
(DT) It is desirable to believe only what is true.8 
 
Horwich, of course, accepts both the claim that truth is normatively 
significant for belief and the claim that (DT) holds good. His answer to the 
question of why (DT) holds, i.e. why it is desirable to believe only what is 
true, begins with a “true”-free reformulation of a particular instance of 
(DT)—an instance which concerns what Horwich calls “a directly action-
guiding proposition”: 
 
[It] is easily seen why I should want it to be the case, for example, that I 
believe that if I run I will escape, only if I will escape if I run. I want this 
because, given a desire to escape, that belief would lead to a certain action 
(running), and that action would satisfy my desire if indeed it implies 
escape. This is why I would like it to be that I believe that I will escape if I 
run, only if I will indeed escape if I run (Horwich 1998, p. 139). 
 
In the context of the passage just quoted, Horwich’s aim is to explain 
why the general principle (DT) holds good and, moreover, to do this in a 
way that establishes that the truth talk involved in (DT) serves merely as a 
device for expressing the required generalisation over propositions. To this 
end, he argues that an explanation analogous to the one given in response 
to the question of why it is desirable for me to believe <if I run I will 
escape>, only if I will escape if I run, can be given for all my beliefs that 
have directly action-guiding contents. However, “directly action-guiding 
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beliefs are derived from other beliefs” and “any of our beliefs might be a 
premise in some such inference” (p. 140). Therefore, says Horwich, (DT) 
holds good. Note that this explanation does indeed steer clear of using the 
concept of truth explanatorily. The predicate “is true” is used only in the 
final generalising step that takes us from particular instances of the schema 
“if it is desirable to believe <p>, then p” to the explicit generalisation 
(DT). Arguably, at that point all explanatory work has already been done. 
For present concerns, the most relevant part of Horwich’s explanation 
of (DT) is the long quote above. Let us grant that it contains the 
ingredients of a good explanation of why it is desirable for me to believe 
<if I run I will escape>, only if I will escape if I run, and more generally 
for why we want our beliefs to be true. Can the explanatory strategy 
exemplified in the quote from Horwich be adapted so as to provide a good 
explanation of, say, (T-)—which states that it is correct to assert <DOGS> 
only if some dogs are vicious? The answer, I think, has to be that it cannot 
be so adapted, for the following simple reason: while (T-) holds without 
exception and, therefore, independently of the various practical goals we 
might have, the claim that it is desirable to assert <DOGS>, only if there 
are vicious dogs, does not hold without exception or independently of our 
practical goals. What we desire the propositional contents of our assertions 
to be like is one thing, what the propositional contents of our assertions 
have to be like in order for our assertions to be correct is quite another. To 
interpret “why does (T-) hold?” as “why is it desirable to assert <DOGS>, 
only if some dogs are vicious?” amounts to changing the subject. 
Questions about assertoric correctness just don’t translate quite as 
smoothly as Horwich would have us believe into questions about what we 
want the propositional contents of our assertions to be like. 
Of course, these considerations cast doubt only on the prospects of 
explaining (T-) along the lines of Horwich’s account of (DT). They do next 
to nothing to establish that “true”-free explanations of (T-) are impossible. 
It merits emphasis, however, that even if an acceptable “true”-free 
explanation of (T-) were to be given, the line of argument presented in 
section 4 would be weakened only in part. What would remain standing is 
the point that the explanatory use of the truth predicate in (B) is both 
perfectly legitimate and not accessible to standard deflationary treatment. 
What, then, can the deflationist say about the role of truth talk in (B)? 
(3) Another rejoinder to the argument given above might be to concede 
that (T-) holds but then to go on and say that (T-) registers a basic 
constraint on the correctness of assertions of <DOGS>—a constraint that 
neither requires nor allows of explanation. In order to make good on this 
rejoinder the deflationist would have to make a case for the claim that (Q), 
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despite being a prima facie legitimate request for explanation, can 
ultimately be dismissed as unanswerable. No one can answer it, and 
therefore the fact that the deflationist cannot answer it should not be held 
against her deflationism—or so the thought would have to go. 
But this kind of manoeuvre should really be the last resort. At any rate, 
to reply to (Q) by declaring (T-) to register a brute or basic normative fact 
would seem to be an inappropriate over-reaction. After all, (Q) would 
certainly not seem to be unanswerable. In fact, above I have offered an 
answer to it. If deflationism should make it impossible for its advocates to 
offer one as well, then this must be taken to cast doubt, not on the 
possibility of giving an answer to (Q), but on deflationism.  
In order to appreciate that (T-) does indeed stand in need of explanation 
it suffices to notice that norms analogous to (T-) do not hold with respect 
to all speech acts. The following, for example, does not express a valid 
norm for asking the question of whether some dogs are vicious: 
 
[It is correct to ask whether some dogs are vicious] only if some dogs are 
vicious. 
 
Why, then, is it correct to assert <DOGS> only if there are vicious dogs, 
whereas the existence or non-existence of vicious dogs is irrelevant to the 
normative correctness of asking whether there are such dogs? If (Q) were 
unanswerable, then so would be this question. Claiming the latter, 
however, would seem to be outré, to say the least. 
A somewhat more subtle variant of the objection just dismissed would 
start from the concession that (Q) is answerable, but then go on to insist 
that all one can reasonably expect by way of an answer to (Q) is this: 
because (T-) captures an important aspect of what we mean by “correct 
assertion of <DOGS>”. This rejoinder might go hand in hand with the 
consideration that (T-) can be construed as part of an implicit definition of 
the concept of correct assertion, i.e. as part of a definition that would 
comprise, among many others, all sentences of the form “it is correct to 
assert <p> only if p”. Appeal to the concept of truth would thus be 
avoided, and this can be expected to make the rejoinder under discussion 
attractive to deflationists. 
As far as they go, these points are fair. But in order to constitute an 
objection against my line of argument, they would have to be 
supplemented by a convincing case for the claim that something is wrong 
with the explanation (B) of (T-) that has been given above. Recall that the 
target of my argument is not deflationism per se, but (NER), i.e. a claim 
that many deflationists assume themselves, rightly or wrongly, to be 
committed to in virtue of their deflationary accounts of truth. Deflationists 
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rest their commitment to (NER) on the claim that all occurrences of truth 
talk in explanations can be adequately accounted for in terms of the 
standard deflationary moves (a) and (b). I take the considerations in 
section 4 above to establish that this claim is false. As long as no further 
arguments are forthcoming—arguments, that is, to the conclusion that, 
despite all appearances to the contrary, the concept of truth does not play 
an explanatory role in (B)—(B)’s status as a counterexample to (NER) 
remains untouched. 
(4) In (A+) and in (B), the predicate “is true” is involved in sentences 
which are multiply embedded. In (B), for instance, its first occurrence is in 
the antecedent of a conditional, its second in the consequent of another 
conditional. To complicate matters, the two conditionals in which the truth 
predicate occurs are the conjuncts of a conjunction which, in turn, is 
embedded in a non-extensional compound: the conjunction is the 
explanans-clause of a “because”-sentence. 
The line of argument presented above repeatedly relies on the claim 
that the role of the truth talk involved in (A+) and (B) is not accessible to 
standard deflationary treatment in terms of (a)—the fact that it is not 
accessible to (b) can be ignored in the present context. Now, a deflationist 
might concede this claim but complain that it cannot be used in the way 
suggested above, since the failure of (a) in accounting for the role of the 
truth talk involved in (B) is simply due to the fact that the sentential 
connective “because” generates contexts which are not transparent. 
Indeed, many deflationists restrict the intersubstitutivity of a given 
revealing truth ascription, R, and the sentences expressing the propositions 
that truth is ascribed to in R, to extensional contexts (see, for instance, 
Field 2008, p. 210; Armour-Garb and Woodbridge 2010, p. 66). Therefore, 
or so the rejoinder would have to go, (B) cannot be used to show that there 
is anything wrong with the deflationist’s interpretation of and commitment 
to (NER). 
But this objection can be resisted for several reasons. In the first place, 
recall that (NER) is a thesis about the role of the concept of truth in 
explanations and that one paradigmatic way of expressing explanations is 
by means of “because”-statements. So it seems legitimate to expect (NER) 
to cover the claim that the conceptual contribution which the truth 
predicate can make to the contents expressed by explanatory “because”-
statements is itself never explanatory. If that expectation is warranted, then 
a restriction of (a) to extensional contexts has the effect of rendering 
useless the deflationist’s main argument for (NER), i.e. (DeflatioNER). 
Notice, moreover, that there is nothing wrong with logically complex 
explanantia per se. We use them all the time. 
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More importantly, we can evacuate the sentences whose conjunction 
constitutes the explanans-clause of (B) from their opaque context and 
write them down as premises in a little argument that has (T-) as its 
conclusion: 1. <DOGS> is true only if some dogs are vicious, 2. (T+), 
therefore: 3. (T-). Next, we can say of this argument that it is (part of) the 
best available explanation of (T-) and run the reasoning from section 4 
with respect to what is expressed by the sentences 1. and 2.—which, of 
course, are no longer embedded in a non-extensional context. The upshot 
of this line of reasoning is the same as that of section 4 above. The 
deflationist cannot offer the argument as an explanation of (T-) because, 
while maybe being entitled to the first premise, she is not entitled to the 
second, i.e. to (T+). More importantly, the role of the truth predicate in 
premise 2. cannot be accounted for along the lines of (a)—restricted to 
extensional contexts or not. 
(5) The last rejoinder that I want to anticipate would try to make good 
on the claim that deflationists should remain unmoved by all that has been 
said here concerning the explanation of (T-) in terms of truth—because 
what they are committed to is not (NER), but rather: 
 
(NERcausal) The concept of truth has no explanatory role to play in causal 
explanations.9 
 
Now, the explanations (A+) and (B) of (T-) are certainly not causal 
explanations. Maybe they can best be described as offering conceptual 
explanations of (T-) (see Schnieder 2006, pp. 31-35; 2011). Commitment 
to (NERcausal) is, of course, compatible with granting the notion of truth any 
non-causal explanatory role whatsoever. But if a deflationist were to insist 
that all she wanted to deny is that the notion of truth has causal-
explanatory import, it would be difficult to help the impression that she 
betrays her cause. After all, deflationists take the thesis that the notion of 
truth is explanatorily inert to be something that distinguishes their 
accounts from traditional, non-deflationary approaches to truth. 
(NERcausal), however, expresses a claim that many advocates of traditional 
correspondence or coherence theories, say, will find utterly 
unobjectionable. This suggests that deflationists, even when they explicitly 
endorse only (NERcausal), have a broader thesis in mind, one that covers but 
is not exhausted by the claim that the notion of truth has no explanatory 
role to play in causal explanations. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
I have claimed that (B) can be used to show that the argument 
(DeflatioNER), the driving force behind the deflationist’s commitment to 
(NER), is unsound. (B) can be used to show this because it is a 
counterexample to (DeflatioNER)’s second premise. Furthermore, I have 
claimed that (B) should be accepted as a counterexample to (NER). It is 
hard to see how the conceptual contribution that the truth predicate makes 
to the explanatory content expressed by (B)’s explanans-clause could be 
understood as anything other than itself explanatory. In fact, the truth 
predicate is precisely what makes the content expressed by (B) an 
explanation of (T-). Assume, for the sake of argument, that these claims 
are correct. Should we then also take (B) to amount to a general refutation 
of the deflationist outlook on truth, along the lines suggested by Williams 
(2002, p. 157)? Is (NER) really that central to deflationism? 
The question cannot be dealt with at any useful length here. Notice, 
however, that while (NER) is central to many deflationary accounts there 
is another, equally central, deflationary thesis which would seem to be 
perfectly compatible with accepting (B) as a counterexample to both 
(DeflatioNER)’s second premise and (NER): the claim that, as Bar-On and 
Simmons couch it, “there is no substantive property of truth shared by all 
and only [those] things we (properly) call true” (Bar-On and Simmons 
2007, p. 83). Nothing in the line of argument given above suggests that, 
for the concept of truth to be able to do its explanatory work in the 
explanation of (T-), truth has to be a substantial property in the sense 
hinted at (and rejected) by Bar-On and Simmons. The only metaphysical 
assumption—the only one concerning the question of what truth is, the 
nature of truth—that is at work in the preceding line of argument is that 
truth is a property. This assumption is consistent with what most 
contemporary deflationists (apart from some prosententialists) have to say, 
by way of metaphysics, about the nature of truth. 
What my argument casts doubt on is not the deflationist’s metaphysics 
of truth but her proposed account of the concept of truth. Accepting an 
indispensable explanatory role for that concept in the context of 
understanding and explaining (T-) is consistent with conceding everything 
the deflationist has to say about the dispensability of truth talk in stating or 
expressing the normative content of (T+) (for a similar point see Bar-On 
and Simmons 2007). In expressing the normative point of (T+) all 
reference to the truth or untruth of <DOGS> can be skipped. We can 
express that content by means of (T-). But in explaining why (T-) holds we 
cannot skip reference to the truth or untruth of <DOGS>. Contrary to what 
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many deflationists suggest, a good case can be made for the claim that 
appeal to <DOGS>’s capacity to (fail to) exemplify the property of truth is 
indispensable in explaining why the relevance of the existence or non-
existence of vicious dogs is relevant to the normative status of assertions 
of <DOGS>. To be sure, the explanation of (T-) in terms of (B) involves the 
concept of truth in a rather local explanatory project. But it is an 
explanatory project none the less. So if (B) is a counterexample to (NER), 
then many deflationists should reshuffle their commitments. 
References 
Armour-Garb, B. 2012, “Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth”, 
Philosophy Compass 7 (4), 256 
Armour-Garb, B. and J.A. Woodbridge 2010, “Why Deflationists Should 
Be Pretense Theorists (and Perhaps Already Are)”, in Wright, C.D. and 
N.J.L.L. Pedersen (eds.) 2010, 59 
Bar-On, D. and K. Simmons 2007, “The Use of Force Against 
Deflationism: Assertion and Truth”, in Greimann D. and G. Siegwart 
(eds.) 2007, Truth and Speech Acts, London: Routledge, 61 
Blackburn, S. 2013, “Deflationism, Pluralism, Expressivism, Pragmatism”, 
in Pedersen, N.J.L.L. and C.D. Wright (eds.) 2013, 263 
Brandom, R.B. 2002, “Explanatory vs. Expressive Deflationism About 
Truth”, in Schantz, R. (ed.) 2002, 103 
Damnjanovic, N. 2005, “Deflationism and the Success Argument”, The 
Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218), 53 
—. 2010, “New Wave Deflationism”, in Wright, C.D. and N.J.L.L. 
Pedersen (eds.) 2010, 45 
Dodd, J. 2013, “Deflationism Trumps Pluralism”, in Pedersen, N.J.L.L. 
and C.D. Wright (eds.) 2013, 298 
Field, H. 2001, Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
—. 2008, Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Grover, D. 2002, “On Locating Our Interest in Truth”, in Schantz, R. (ed.) 
2002, 120 
Horsten, L. 2009, “Levity”, Mind 118 (471), 555 
—. 2010, “On a Necessary Use of Truth in Epistemology”, in Czarnecki, 
T. et. al. (eds.), The Analytical Way, London: College Publications, 371 
—. 2011, The Tarskian Turn. Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
Horwich, P. 1998, Truth, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
—. 2001, “A Defense of Minimalism”, Synthèse 126 (1/2), 149 
—. 2002, “Norms of Truth and Meaning”, in Schantz, R. (ed.) 2002, 133 
Chapter Two 
 
 
36
—. 2010, “What Is Truth?”, in Horwich, P., Truth—Meaning—Reality, 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1 
Jenkins, C.S. 2008, “Romeo, René, and the Reasons Why: What 
Explanation Is”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1), 61  
Künne, W. 2003, Conceptions of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Pedersen, N.J.L.L. and C.D. Wright (eds.) 2013, Truth and Pluralism: 
Current Debates, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Schantz, R. (ed.) 2002, What is Truth?, Berlin, New York: de Gruyter 
Schnieder, B. 2006, “Truth-Making without Truth-Makers”, Synthèse 152, 
21 
—. 2011, “A Logic for ‘Because’”, The Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3), 
445 
Soames, S. 1999, Understanding Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Williams, M. 1999, “Meaning and Deflationary Truth”, The Journal of 
Philosophy 99 (11), 545 
—. 2002, “On Some Critics of Deflationism”, in Schantz, R. (ed.) 2002, 
146 
—. 2007, “Meaning, Truth and Normativity”, in Greimann, D. and G. 
Siegwart (eds.) 2007, 377 
Wright, C.D. and N.J.L.L. Pedersen (eds.) 2010, New Waves in Truth, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 For helpful discussions of, and comments on, previous versions of this paper I am 
grateful to an audience at the SIFA congress “The Answers of Philosophy” 
(Alghero, September 2012), to the participants of the Cogito workshop “Gaps, 
Gluts, and Truth” at the University of Padova (May 2013) and, in particular, to 
Stefano Caputo. 
2 “<Some dogs are vicious>” is short for “the proposition that some dogs are 
vicious” (see Horwich 1998, p. 10). Since I will make heavy use of the proposition 
that some dogs are vicious (even though it will nowhere be asserted in what 
follows), I will most of the times abbreviate further and write “<DOGS>” as short 
for “the proposition that some dogs are vicious”. 
3  I take explanatory “because”-statements to have the form “EXPLANANDUM 
because EXPLANANS”, where the two words in small capitals are placeholders for 
declarative sentences. For some differences between genuinely explanatory and 
other “because”-statements see Schnieder (2011, p. 447). 
4 To my knowledge, the last point—which might reasonably be taken as signalling 
a problem in deflationary accounts of the role and function of propositionally 
revealing truth talk—has so far not been addressed in the debate on deflationism. 
Note also that if the extra content of revealing truth ascriptions may sometimes be 
part of the relevant content, then an analogous point should be expected to hold for 
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unrevealing contexts of truth talk as well. This may spell trouble for the 
“exhaustively” in (b). For what follows, however, these observations can be set 
aside. 
5 See, for instance, Field (2001, p. 153): “[T]here is nothing in deflationism that 
prevents the use of ‘true’ in explanations as long as its only role there is as a device 
for generalisation”. See also Williams (2002, 2007). 
6 Arguments along these lines can, for instance, be found in Horwich (2001, 2002), 
Dodd (2013), Williams (2002) and Blackburn (2013). 
7  Here is a representative statement by Horwich (2001, p. 160): “Clearly our 
commitments to norms like this one [to norms like (T-), B.R.] have nothing to do 
with the concept of truth; for that concept is completely absent from their 
articulation.” 
8 A variant of the same move, along disquotationalist lines, can be found in Field 
(2001, pp. 120-121). 
9 A no-explanatory-role claim along the lines of (NERcausal) is made in Field (2001, 
p. 29, p. 152, p. 173). 
